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INTRODUCTION
A roundtable discussion took place in Brussels on October 12, 2009 with the aim 
of producing concrete proposals on how banking could be reformed to prevent 
a systemic collapse on the scale witnessed almost exactly a year before. 
The current crisis represents a one-off opportunity to reshape the banking sector 
and impose a degree of control over it that will, discussants hoped, reduce future 
danger to the financial system and help set the global economy on a path to 
sustainable growth.
A consensus emerged about the key elements of the banking crisis and how they 
should be addressed. Discussants agreed there was a compelling argument for 
regulation given the societal damage – lost jobs, housing delinquencies, impact 
on Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs), impact on developing countries 
– that the crisis has caused. Joseph Stiglitz, Co-President of the Initiative for 
Policy Dialogue at Columbia University and Nobel Prize Winner, remarked that 
Adam Smith’s belief in the ability of markets to allocate capital correctly appears 
flawed. “The reason that the invisible hand of markets seems invisible is that it is 
not there,” Professor Stiglitz said. However, the visible hand of regulation, such 
as Basel II, also failed to prevent the crisis. Regulation across the board has 
failed largely because it has not been in the interest of politicians, companies and 
individuals to encourage strong supervisory powers.
A majority of discussants thought that regulation should now be comprehensive 
across countries and institutions. A crucial aspect of any new regulation should 
be counter-cyclical measures, meaning that financial institutions increase balance 
sheet capital during the upswing of a cycle and draw on this capital buffer when 
the economy trends down again.
Regulation should not only focus on the capital structure and liquidity of banks 
but should impose detailed restrictions on risk-taking, including rules on 
incentives. Some, but not all, discussants believed there should be a tax on 
transactions to reduce volumes and, consequently, the fees paid by companies 
in the real economy. 
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But a positive – rather than merely restrictive, agenda should be applied in the 
setting of regulation to ensure that elements crucial to future growth – such as 
SMEs and emerging markets – receive capital that is diverted from less useful 
applications. 
Some roundtable participants were concerned that the desire for regulation 
will wane if the economy continues to recover. The reform agenda must not 
be allowed to slip or the next crisis will not be far away, argued Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen, President of the Party of European Socialists. “There needs to be 
strong leadership; we need to regulate now,” he said.
The danger is not that new regulation will stifle the nascent recovery, as the 
banking lobby argues, but that under-regulation will create future systemic 
risks. Discussants acknowledged that regulation may not always find its target, 
but dynamic regulation can ensure it constantly evolves to meet changing 
requirements. Regulation should also be robust, applying a multi-pronged 
approach to each problem, even if this adds complexity.  
While global regulatory co-ordination was seen as desirable by many discussants, 
in practice it is unlikely to take place. Therefore, each country or political bloc 
should not wait for others to act but protect their citizens from unsuitable, 
externally-sourced products by regulating their own financial institutions.
Discussants from 4 different continents joined the high-level roundtable debate on the 
regulation of the banking sector representing EU institutions, international organisations, 
business and industry, non-governmental organisations, think-tanks and academia
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SESSION I  Promoting financial stability 
in Basel II 
Opening The first session focused on the catalysts behind the banking and credit 
crisis, with a view to establishing whether the main cause for the crisis of the 
financial services sector was weakness in Basel II or whether the whole structure 
of financial markets was to blame. 
Co-moderator Giles Merritt, Secretary General of Friends of Europe, welcomed 
the participants. He asked whether Basel rules need updating after four years 
without amendments. Is Basel III a good idea, given that a lot of people feel 
that Basel II provided inadequate protection?  “A major question in my mind is 
whether Europe has got its act together sufficiently to have a major hand in the 
rewriting of global rules,” he said.
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, President of the Party of European Socialists, then 
developed these themes. He believes the biggest concern surrounds the wide-
spread belief that the recession is ending. A common refrain seems to be that “it 
is just a question of time before it ends, so let’s not introduce forceful regulation 
where we might make mistakes,” said Mr Rasmussen.  This is erroneous and 
efforts should be made to build on the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh where finance 
ministers agreed on the need for cross-border regulation. 
Basel II has failed principally because there has been no level playing field for 
and between supervisory bodies. Bankers themselves have also to be blamed 
“There have been bubbles before, 
but this is the most costly since 
World War II. In the absence of further 
regulation, the next one will be even 
more costly.”
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, 
President of the Party of European Socialists
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for being unable to resist temptation in the new product markets that have 
grown so rapidly in the last 5-6 years. He pointed to the Turner report of the 
London based Financial Services Authority which states that financial markets 
have grown too fast and have outgrown the real economy. Finance is no longer 
entirely socially useful.  
“There have been bubbles before, but this is the most costly since World 
War II,” Mr Rasmussen said. “In the absence of further regulation, the 
next one will be even more costly.” There should be an end to soft regulation 
and codes of conduct. Future regulation must be all-encompassing and include 
all financial participants. “That goes for banks, hedge funds and private equity, 
which are skeptical about new regulation. There should be no shadow 
banking system.”
Effects of the banking crisis not restricted to financial sector
Joseph Stiglitz, Co-President of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia 
University and Nobel Prize Winner in Economics in 2001, started his introductory 
remarks by noting that the banking crisis has not just lost the financial system 
money, but all elements of society due to huge misallocation of capital. “It is 
the biggest waste of economic capital since the war, costing literally trillions of 
dollars. No democratic government has ever misallocated resources on 
this scale” he said. 
In trying to understand what went wrong, we need to understand that there 
were a whole set of failures of incentives. “Private rewards were misaligned 
with social rewards,” argued Professor Stiglitz. “Huge bonuses were paid when 
there were huge negative profits. Society accepted a certain inequality as a 
necessity for innovation and productivity. But when there are inefficiencies, this 
is hard to justify.”
Corporate governance proved to be weak and many corporations gave 
executives incentive structures that were not in the social interest or even in the 
interest of shareholders. This contrasts with the situation in the 19th century 
where individuals owned their own firms and risked their own money. The current 
“agency” conflict leads to non-transparency - for instance in stock options - and 
creates incentives to move assets off the balance sheet. 
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The crisis confirms that the theory that markets are self-adjusting is probably 
wrong, Professor Stiglitz posited. Most policymakers still agree with Adam Smith 
that the pursuit of self-interest leads to efficient investment decisions and markets. 
“This is plain wrong,” said Professor Stiglitz. “The reason that the invisible hand 
of markets seems invisible is that it is not there.” In this respect, the economic 
profession bears some blame. Other commonly held economic beliefs such as 
it is impossible to predict a bubble before it breaks, or that even if you can call 
a bubble you can’t deal with it, are also wrong, he said. “We have sufficient 
evidence of pro-cyclicality in the system and of the need for macro-prudential 
regulation and we should be confident that as imperfect as regulation may be, 
it will improve the system.” He added “most absurd of all, is the notion that it is 
better to clean up the mess rather than interfere in innovative financial markets. 
Cleaning up the mess will cost trillions and trillions of dollars.”
The principal areas of banking weakness
Professor Stiglitz highlighted three specific aspects of banking as particularly damaging: 
§ Mis-allocating capital
§ Mis-managing risk
§ High transaction costs
“The financial sector did not do what it was supposed to,” he said, and the fact 
that 40% of all corporate profits go into the financial sector is worrying. “We will 
need to restructure the financial system,” Professor Stiglitz said. “But we should 
not downsize it uniformly. We downsize the gambling part - that can go to Las 
Vegas - and expand parts that provide capital to business and venture capital.”
“Huge bonuses were paid when there 
were huge negative profits. Society 
accepted a certain inequality as a 
necessity for innovation and 
productivity. But when there are 
inefficiencies, this is hard to justify.”
Joseph Stiglitz, Co-President of the Initiative 
for Policy Dialogue at Columbia University 
and a Nobel Prize Winner
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As regards risk, banks have merely sought to avoid regulation via regulatory 
arbitrage. They have succeeded, they were innovative, but now we are paying 
the price, said Professor Stiglitz, citing home ownership risk as an example. 
“They came up with products that made it harder for people to manage this 
risk, so millions of people are losing homes and life savings in the US.” Much of 
the innovation was to free up capital to obtain more leverage which increased 
risk. The reward was for increasing beta, not alpha. “Risk managers did not 
distinguish between alpha and beta, which was criminal,” Professor Stiglitz 
added. A critique of self-regulation and delegation of risk management to ratings 
agencies is necessary, he said. Alan Greenspan’s assertion that people managed 
risk better individually, failed to anticipate agency problems and externalities. 
The financial sector should be a means to an end. In terms of transaction costs, 
modern technology should allow the development of an efficient electronic 
payment system, he said. Transaction costs should be a fraction of a percent, 
but the 3-4 % which went to “bank monopolies” represent a huge tax on society. 
Professor Stiglitz moved on to address the issue of banks being too big to fail. 
He said: “Banks will again put a gun at the head of policymakers in future and 
say ‘if you don’t bail us out the sky will fall’. We have got to get rid of these banks. 
If they are too big to fail, they are too big to be.” He suggested suspending 
limited liability and moving to joint liability by executives. There should be 
greater restrictions on the exempt structure, no more proprietary trading and no 
derivatives trading of “Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), that are owned by about five 
big banks, backed by governments. This is dynamically unstable.”
In conclusion, he posited that new regulatory frameworks are necessary to stabilise the 
global economy. This, he said, should be a significant part of the ensuing discussion.
Back to the future 
Co-moderator Gillian Tett, Capital Markets Editor of the Financial Times, chose 
an anecdote to highlight the current phase of the crisis: 
“I recently got an email from a senior banker. He said: ‘forget about the events 
of last 12 months, the City and Wall Street are alive and well, short-term trades 
are back in vogue and the job market is bid aggressively. Any sense of control 
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has been thrown out the window. Banks’ PRs will tell you about the subdued 
atmosphere in banks, but don’t believe it. After the dotcom bust it took years 
for the market to get its act together - this time it was just a few months. Will 
anything ever change?’
This person is a wise old bird I’ve known for years,” continued Ms Tett. “Many 
bankers don’t believe anything will change and probably have good reason to 
think that. They are responding to short-term incentives.”
Caution: The consensus is not always right
Avinash Persaud, Chairman of Intelligence Capital Limited and Chair of the Warwick 
Commission, said he wanted to challenge some of the opening remarks and other 
common assumptions to ensure the debate was sufficiently robust.
First, managing a crisis is impossible to do during a crisis. Next, the fact that tax 
payers spent trillions on saving bankers means they now want public executions. 
This is erroneous.  “The crisis was not caused by bankers throwing toxic weapons 
of mass destruction and running away,” said Mr Persaud. “They threw them and 
ran towards the crowd.”  People always underestimate the risks during a boom 
and overestimate the risks afterwards. If bonuses and capital are to be linked to 
risk, this will reinforce the cycle. 
Gillian Tett, Capital Markets Editor of the Financial Times 
co-moderated the high-level roundtable debate
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Micro-prudential regulation is not the answer on its’ own. “Big banks love micro- 
prudential regulation because they can afford it,” noted Mr Persaud.  “Our previous 
system was to reward people who had the biggest products and databases 
- the big banks. So we need to be wary of that.”
Macro-prudential regulation is not prevalent because it is in no-one’s interest to 
burst the bubble, he said. The politics of macro-prudential regulation need to 
be addressed.
Mr Persaud was particularly emphatic on the need to limit the size of the financial 
sector. “For a medium to large sized economy, financial services should be 
0.5%, not 20-30 per cent,” he said.  The Tobin Tax proposal had potential in this 
respect, despite the derision of bankers who are rewarded for selling products. 
“If I set up a fund and buy a product that matures in 20 years, I need never see a 
banker,” said Mr Persaud.
 
The clamour for increased capital may not by itself reduce systemic risk. “Risk 
management is not just about putting aside capital, because the misallocation 
of risk is just as dangerous as before,” argued Mr Persaud. “We put risks in all 
the wrong places: banks are good at credit risks while pension funds and private 
equity are good places for long-term risk. But banks ended up with illiquid risk 
and pension funds ended up with credit risk. This was all wrong. We should 
encourage risks to go where there is capacity for that risk.”
“We put risks in all the wrong places: 
banks are good at credit risks while 
pension funds and private equity are 
good places for long-term risk. 
But banks ended up with illiquid risk 
and pension funds ended up with 
credit risk. This was all wrong.”
Avinash Persaud, Chairman of Intelligence Capital 
Limited and chair of the Warwick Commission
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He added that Basel II failed in many ways, particularly in allowing regulatory 
discretion. “We should leave little room for discretion, and move towards a more 
rule-based system.”
Counter-cyclical regulation: The missing tool
Stephany Griffith-Jones, Head of Financial Markets of the Initiative for Policy 
Dialogue at Columbia University, agreed with earlier discussants that efforts 
should be made to reduce growth in the financial sector. “In a boom the least 
desirable part grows the most,” she observed. 
She also concurred with Mr Persaud over the need for macro-prudential 
regulation.  “If pro-cyclical behaviour is inherent in markets, then we know that is 
the main market failure. So regulation must be macro-prudential, leaning against 
the wind to try to curb booms.” This need had initially been recognised by a 
small group of people about 10 years ago and has developed into a consensus 
today following reports by the US and UK Treasuries, the UN Stiglitz Commission, 
Jacques de Larosière, Lord Turner, the Warwick Commission and others. 
The question is now how to implement effective and comprehensive counter-
cyclical regulation. “In 2000, Spain introduced counter-cyclical regulation into 
the banking sector, so it shows it can be done,” added Professor Griffith-Jones. 
“They correctly perceived that risks were generated when loans were made, not 
when they became delinquent.” 
She noted that it strengthened Spanish banks in the current crisis but it has 
been less effective in curbing the real estate boom, since it did not include loan-
to-value ratios. Regulation is necessary to control credit, a key macroeconomic 
variable. “Monetary policy has been the focus but policies towards regulating 
credit have been paid little attention.”
“If pro-cyclical behaviour is inherent in markets, then we know 
that is the main market failure. So regulation must be macro-
prudential, leaning against the wind to try to curb booms.”
Stephany Griffith-Jones, Head of Financial Markets of the Initiative for Policy 
Dialogue at Columbia University
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She went on to outline desirable changes such as the use of several different 
policy instruments for counter-cyclical regulation that are needed (provisions, 
capital, leverage, etc) after this crisis because the financial sector comprises a 
host of different problems. This will increase complexity in regulation but it will be 
necessary to have “both belt and braces”. 
Additionally, pre-determined rules are clearly preferable to discretion – there 
should be capacity to tighten rules if a boom is too strong, but not to loosen the 
rules. “People always say this time is different, but that is not true,” Professor 
Griffith-Jones said. 
There is too much emphasis on solvency, not enough on liquidity. In the early 
1950s, US banks had 11 per cent of their total capital in liquid assets. It is 
now 0.2%. Liquidity requirements need to be linked to outstanding maturity 
mismatches. Furthermore, “capital requirements should be higher if there are 
liquidity mismatches,” Professor Griffith-Jones argued. 
Stephany Griffith-Jones, Head of Financial Markets of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue 
with Ernst Stetter, Secretary General of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies
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If there are high capital requirements during the good times, there will be higher 
spreads increasing costs especially for small and medium sized enterprises 
and developing countries. So the economy may need additional instruments or 
institutions that will provide long-term credit. If banks are tightly regulated the 
shadow banking system is likely to grow. So we need equivalent regulation for all 
participants. “That sounds interventionist but given regulatory arbitrage, we have 
no other option. We would like to focus on systematically important institutions, 
but how could this be defined ex-ante?”
There is a need for international co-ordination. If Europe is regulated well and the 
US is not, then Europe will suffer. Europe has an advantage in the formulation 
of such regulation because of its existing capital directives, and because of 
progress on a European regulator.
Lastly, Professor Griffith-Jones argued that it is important to agree the timing of 
counter-cyclical regulation while the impetus from the crisis existed. It could be 
implemented later, as credit and the economies start recovering.
The danger of ill considered-regulation
Claudio Borio, Head of Research and Policy Analysis at the Bank for International 
Settlements, agreed. “We need to take advantage of this window of opportunity, 
but the devil is in the detail. Putting things in place that are workable and effective 
is not easy.” He emphasized that he is a long standing supporter of counter-
cyclical regulation. 
He argued that capital requirements work well in the boom phase, but in a bust 
they are pro-cyclical because people pull back to short-term securities. “We 
accuse markets of being short-termist, let’s not make the same mistake,” he 
added and stressed the importance of liquidity regulation.
Stephany Griffith-Jones, Head of Financial Markets of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue 
with Ernst Stetter, Secretary General of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies
“We need to bring together bank supervisors at 
operational level and insulate them from governments, 
because governments try to take credit for booms.” 
Claudio Borio, Head of Research and Policy Analysis 
of the Bank for International Settlements
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Alistair Milne, Senior Lecturer in Banking and Finance at City University London, 
was also wary. “I am agnostic on the role of the market to allocate efficiently. The 
danger is to some extent that we go too far in the other direction. I challenge the 
assumption that we need pro-active counter-cyclical policy. The prior issue is 
whether the level of capital is moving up or down during the cycle.”
Arturo O’Connell, Member of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of 
Argentina, stressed the importance of the Pecora Commission in the 1930’s, as 
a catalyst for good regulation.
Angus Armstrong, Head of Macroeconomic Analysis, HM Treasury, said there 
is too much discussion on prohibition and not enough on positive aspects 
of regulation. For instance, how best to apply the most basic principles of 
finance. “There were many more positive ideas around in the 1930s than there 
are today,” he said. 
Gillian Tett said bankers are only behaving rationally in gambling with their bank’s 
money, so the structures need to be changed. “Bankers don’t have job stability,” 
she said. “The most rational thing they can do is roll the dice. The idea of banning 
bonuses needs more debate. 
On the political side, clamping down on the financial sector would mean capital 
would be constrained and mortgages harder to get, companies would be starved 
of funding and the City hit by fewer tax revenues.
Restrictions on incentives: Sector unlikely to sustain damage
Professor Stiglitz returned to the debate, arguing that macro-prudential 
regulation would enhance stability because of the ability to monitor and analyse 
credit cycles in economic cycles. “It is not perfect, but it is much less imperfect 
than the current system,” he said.
He further argued that regulation on incentives does not damage the sector. 
Studies of incentive pay have shown that incentive pay is a misnomer, he said. “It 
is mostly theft. When performance is high they pay incentive pay, when it is low 
they call it retention pay. So it is all a deception. We did not learn anything from 
Enron and WorldCom. 
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How do we convey the right signals? he asked. “We could use anti-trust laws 
except that most big banks do not have a large enough share of any market to 
be prosecuted.”
He finalised by stating that the right incentives must be created in the economic 
system at large; the crisis was a broad failure not only in measuring risk, but also 
in anti-trust laws, corporate governance and financial education.
Mr Rasmussen insisted that concerns about the possible unintended consequences 
of regulation should be set aside. “If we look for perfect regulation that persists for 
100 years we will not find it. We can’t get worse than the situation now. So we 
need courage to do the best we can do. If we run into unforeseen problems, 
we will adjust.” The framework should be agreed on now, while there is still the 
necessary impetus for regulation. We need a good banking system for the 21st 
Century that will, for example, provide long term finance to avoid climate change.
Basel committee: The next steps
Stefan Walter, Secretary General of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
outlined the work of the committee to date. He prefaced his overview by saying: 
“If we don’t have a comprehensive answer across sectors, there is a risk that 
activity simply moves to the least regulated part of the system.” 
Minimum capital requirements, and the level and quality of capital are currently 
woefully inadequate, he said. The minimum requirement for the highest quality 
of capital - common equity to risk-based assets - is 2%. That needs to be 
strengthened with a greater focus on common equity. 
“There will be lot of pressure from the industry, saying 
that buffers are too high and that they will cut efficiency 
and threaten the recovery. But the greater risk is that we 
undershoot the mark.”
 
Stefan Walter, Secretary General of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision
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The most risky activities should be adequately capitalised. “The trading book has 
been the biggest problem, not Basel II which deals with the banking book,” said 
Mr Walter.  “Many institutions built up trading books in excess of 50% of their 
balance sheet. The old VAR based standards were ok for highly liquid products 
like foreign exchange and interest rate swaps, but trading books are increasingly 
full of highly structured illiquid instruments.” The Committee has issued a final 
revision to trading book rules which will almost triple capital requirements, a 
move which will be phased in at the end of 2010. In addition, a concrete proposal 
for a global liquidity standard will be issued in January 2010.
Strengthening micro prudential regulation is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for financial stability, Mr Walter said. This needs to be supplemented 
with macro-prudential reforms to address broader systemic risks in the banking 
sector. For example, the Basel Committee has announced that it will introduce a 
leverage ratio to underpin the risk based requirement, which will help constrain 
an unacceptable build-up of leverage in the banking system. The Committee will 
promote the build up of counter-cyclical buffers and capital cushions in good 
times including more forward looking provisioning. 
The inter-connectedness of the banking sector is a critical issue. The 
Committee is reviewing the need for higher capital and liquidity standards 
for large complex systemic institutions as well as other possible measures 
directed at these institutions such as more intrusive supervision. Mr Walter 
ended by warning: “There will be a lot of pressure from the industry, saying 
that capital requirements are too high and that they will cut efficiency and 
threaten the recovery. But the greater risk is that we end up undershooting 
the mark.”
Regulation was not the only failure
Elemér Terták, Director of ‘Financial Institutions’ in the European Commission 
Directorate General for Internal Market and Services, sought to explain the 
Commission’s view on reforming banking. He emphasized that regulation alone 
cannot be blamed for the crisis. As regards Basel II there is neither reason to bury 
it nor should it be praised. Basel II has several advanced features compared to 
its predecessor, but has certain flaws, too. While the flaws need to be improved, 
“we must not throw the baby out with the bathwater.” 
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Strengthening the global financial system by comprehensive regulatory reform is 
a top priority, but full, timely and consistent implementation has to be ensured 
as well. However, that is not sufficient. “One of the problems in Europe is that 
although rules are the same across countries, their enforcement is often patchy.” 
A safer financial system, as well as a level playing field between the countries 
requires consistent enforcement.
“Policymakers have to look beyond capital requirement and liquidity regulation 
to include issues such as remuneration”, he said. Incentivisation is the task 
of shareholders and is part of corporate governance. Major shareholders of 
banks are institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurers, which 
are themselves regulated financial service providers. Corporate governance at 
banks thus must not be the only focus – corporate governance of institutional 
investors needs to be improved so that in the future they pay more attention to 
adequate and sustainable incentivisation at banks. 
Mr Terták also underlined the importance of the macro-prudential oversight, 
but there is a peril to this task: it can easily share the fate of Cassandra. Even 
before the current crisis there were several admonitory warnings, but they were 
disregarded. “Many people have profited from the boom, not just bankers,” said 
Mr Terták. “It increased GDP and incomes as well as the market value of jobs 
and homes. No-one really wanted this wonderful dream to stop.”
Yiannis Kitromilides, Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Westminster, 
agreed that regulation is not the only issue. “We are in danger of losing elements 
of reform by concentrating on regulation. Regulation is not sufficient. We need 
a new social cost-benefit analysis of the benefits of private banking.” He argued 
that the benefits have been exaggerated and the dangers underestimated. 
“One of the problems in Europe is that although 
rules are the same across countries, their 
enforcement is often patchy.” 
Elemér Terták, Director of ‘Financial Institutions’ 
in the European Commission Directorate General 
for Internal Market and Services
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Gillian Tett took up the theme of corporate governance, noting the parallels 
between finance and the pharmaceutical industry. “Both have issues with 
controlling crazy behaviour,” said Ms Tett. “You have profit-seeking companies 
driving innovation. There are extreme information asymmetries and the public 
has no idea what the companies are doing even though the product has a wide 
social impact. Politicians and regulators need to say what the trade-off is for the 
wider public. Essentially, you can be innovative and risk a boom and bust, or less 
innovative but safer.”
Andrew Watt, Senior Researcher at the European Trade Union Institute, argued that 
the analysis of many discussants is flawed. “There is a common idea that regulators 
were asleep at the wheel. But the financial sector was actively deregulated at the 
behest of these same institutions. We have to address this issue.” 
Stephany Griffith-Jones argued that deregulation could be, in effect, reversed. She 
said: “We sometimes get the impression that financial markets are beyond our 
grasp. But they are not natural forces - we have allowed deregulation to evolve 
and it does not have to be like that. It is not like that in many developing countries, 
which have had fewer problems in this crisis. Developed countries have to be 
careful because if they do not have a good system of regulation they could lose 
out to stronger competition from emerging markets. So there is no real choice.”
Credit default swaps in the spotlight
Professor Stiglitz believes CDSs pose such a risk to the financial system that 
they deserved particular focus in the debate. He acknowledged moves to 
trade most of them on exchanges to reduce counterparty risk, but doubted 
this would be effective. “What are the incentives for exchanges to have 
adequate capital?” he asked. “It would not decrease societal risk if the 
risks were insured by governments. We should make all those who trade on 
exchanges jointly liable.” However, he admitted that if that happened, there 
could be very little trading. 
Professor Stiglitz also doubted whether disclosure would increase. “Most CDSs 
will go on exchanges, but there will also be many tailor-made products. The 
problem with this is it is hard to add them up because the products are not 
similar to each other. So aggregate numbers are hard to achieve.” He derided 
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the idea that exchanges would increase market discipline. “How can there be 
market discipline if you don’t know the risks? You would need to know the 
details of commercial contracts, but they are considered market secrets.” As a 
consequence, he believes the move to exchanges would just lead to new forms 
of regulatory arbitrage.
Some practical steps for implementing regulation
There is always some risk in regulating, said Professor Stiglitz. “We can never be 
sure exactly of all the consequences, so we need dynamically robust regulation.” 
He explained that regulation should constantly evolve, but in a way that is 
predictable so there is no regulatory uncertainty. Robust, dynamic regulation 
means each problem must be continually attacked in multiple ways. 
Regulation should address Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) and other 
derivatives, eliminating the pervasive incentive structure. There is a need to 
reduce counterparty risk by regulating trade between banks. Additionally, 
further disclosure and incentives to reduce complexity is needed. “The 
problem with tailor-made derivative products is that it makes it difficult to 
net them out and measure their compounded risk appropriately.”, added 
Professor Stiglitz.
Regulation must restrict negative innovations, but also encourage lending by the 
means of appropriate instruments. “If the banks stop lending disproportionately 
things will get worse,” said Professor Stiglitz. “There are reasons to believe that 
the financial system is going to have a hard time financing small and medium 
sized enterprises.”
Capital and financial market liberalisation has helped facilitate the crisis, said 
Professor Stiglitz, so there is a need to rethink some of the basic principles of 
cross-border financial regulation. This includes more responsibility on the part 
of each host country. “You cannot rely on others,” he said. “If the US will not 
regulate effectively, you have to protect yourself against toxic products. The 
lesson of the East Asia crisis is that banking regulation is important for monitoring 
foreign exchange exposure at the corporate level.” When the financial system 
was more regulated and less liberalized, as for example after World War II, there 
were hardly any banking crises.
25Towards Basel III? Regulating the banking sector after the crisis: Autumn 2009
Mr Rasmussen said there is a consensus over the basic principles for rule-
making. “If we now had a week to make regulation I am sure we could do it.” He 
said that in the absence of widespread revolt from the general public about the 
crisis, there needs to be strong leadership to push the change agenda. 
On the difficulties that regulation might create for long-term financing, he 
advocated a chapter on good banking and long-term financing, with an emphasis 
on the part that pension funds could play. 
Regulation needs to take a counter-cyclical approach and be comprehensive, so 
that private equity and hedge funds are included, he said. “If you take leverage 
in hedge funds and private equity, you can see on a micro level that companies 
that have been in the ownership of private equity, for instance, are now burdened 
by too much leverage and debt. If interest rates increase again, we will see the 
default of many good and sound companies.”
The quest for restructuring without inhibiting growth
Joaquín Almunia, EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, said: “We 
are closer to the end of the crisis but we are still dealing with terrible consequences.”
“We need to find a way of getting sustainable growth. To do it we need ambitious 
reform of the way institutions work. Without a dynamic financial industry, growth 
will be very low and recovery very weak and our sustainability will be affected.” 
In the last year, there was agreement about the next steps and a degree of 
consensus. “But there is a long way to go because now we have to deal with the 
details,” Mr Almunia added. 
“We need to find a way to achieve 
sustainable growth. To do it we need 
ambitious reform of the way institutions 
work. Without a dynamic financial 
industry, growth will be very slow and 
recovery very weak and our sustainability 
will be affected.” 
Joaquín Almunia, EU Commissioner 
for Economic and Monetary Affairs
26 Towards Basel III?: Regulating the banking sector after the crisis: Autumn 2009
Financial institutions need to be better capitalised, he said. “This means less 
leverage and we have to accept this. Society needs to learn how to use financial 
instruments with a lower degree of leverage. How to establish an adequate 
degree of capital is the big question for the next year. The riskiness of assets is 
one consideration in this. “We can no longer treat low-risk assets in the same 
way as high risk assets,” said Mr Almunia. “Basel II was right on the principles. 
EU Commissioner Almunia during a question-and-answer session 
with the international press
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Now in Basel III we will need to avoid the same errors as when implementing 
Basel II, which is the risk in the assets. We need to clarify this - In the US and 
Europe, Tier 1 capital is not the same and we need to reach an agreement.” A 
key issue is quality of capital.
It will not be an easy task to discuss how to deal with systemically-important 
institutions in terms of capital requirements. “What kind of institutions will be 
considered systemic? It is not just large institutions,” he said. Mr Almunia’s other 
key points included:
§ The importance of the elimination of pro-cyclicality.
§ Compensation schemes should be based on ethical and political 
   considerations.  
§ There is no reason to maintain the convergence of accounting standards 
   on both sides of the Atlantic. 
§ Particular attention should be paid to liquidity issues. There are provisions 
   at national level but not across Europe. 
Even before the crisis, the extension of regulation to all products, all markets 
and all institutions was discussed, and the question is how to deliver on 
this political agreement, continued Mr Almunia. “If we are not able to avoid 
regulatory arbitrage, there will be a race to the bottom and we will again face 
these problems.”
He highlighted the previous problems with establishing supervision. “We hope 
an EU systemic risk board will start functioning soon. The Presidency is fully 
committed. We have discussed this at ECOFIN for years but there has been 
resistance at national level because ministers will not share supervisory 
competencies with others.” There is a need to co-ordinate supervisory authorities 
and to mediate when policies are found to be inconsistent. 
Summing up, Mr Almunia said the immediate priorities are crisis prevention, 
management and resolution. “We need procedures to resolve the crisis 
in the best way possible without creating fragmentation of our internal 
markets. There is a risk of public money being injected into the system and 
of renationalisation, which we cannot afford. The political challenge is to find 
a mechanism.”
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SESSION II  Does counter-cyclicality 
point to Basel III?
Ernst Stetter, Secretary General of the Foundation for European Progressive 
Studies (FEPS) began the second session by introducing the panel and re-
assuring that counter cyclicality has to be introduced. 
Claudio Borio, Head of Research and Policy Analysis of the Bank for International 
Settlements, agreed and started by examining more closely the potential for 
regulation to overcome harmful pro-cyclical effects. 
Mr Borio emphasised that “pro-cyclicality is instability through amplification of 
the cycle,” said Mr Borio. “There is a close connection between asset prices and 
short-term aims, credit creation, asset prices, expenditure and output - they all 
rise together.  Since we don’t create cushions in good times, there is no shock 
absorber, but instead a shock amplifier.”
The seeds of financial crisis were sown during the expansion phase, Mr 
Borio continued. There was too much focus on the contraction phase in 
the past. “Pro-cyclicality is the property of the financial system, it is not 
the property of regulation and supervision,” Mr Borio said. The paradox of 
financial instability is that the system looks strongest precisely when it is most 
vulnerable. The risk associated with asset prices and leverage is wrongly 
seen as low. The risk measures employed exacerbate the problem, he said. 
“By embedding pro-cyclical measures of risk we can add to boom/bust 
behaviour. Fair value accounting, for example, can add to pro-cyclicality.” 
Mr Borio also noted that risk measurement acts as a speedometer but not 
as a speed limit. 
Future policy should involve building up buffers during the expansion stage and 
drawing them down within limits during the contraction stage. This will also act 
as a tax on expansion, which is the cause of bubbles. But prudential regulation 
via capital is just one necessary tools. Liquidity, margins standards, loan-to-value 
ratios, provisions as well as fiscal policy and a host of other macro-economic 
policies should be considered in the package. 
It is important to rely as much as possible on rules, said Mr Borio, because they 
reduce the margin of error. “Rules act as pre-commitment devices. The pressure 
not to take action is huge. So rules that take you in the right direction provide a 
solid basis on which to build.”
It is also necessary to think in detail about a governance structure that deals with 
pro-cyclicality and can “take away the punch bowl when the party gets going”, 
he said. “We need to bring together bank supervisors and at operational level 
they should be insulated from government. This is because governments try to 
take credit for booms.” 
Is a counter-cyclical mechanism sufficient to combat crisis?
Alexander Kern, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Cambridge, argued 
that Basel II is flawed and that incorporating a counter-cyclical model will not 
cure the problem. “It can only work effectively for bankers if you can approximate 
regulatory capital to economic capital models,” said Mr Kern. Banking and 
finance are inherently pro-cyclical, he said. This has been made worse by policy 
and regulatory measures. Mark-to-market accounting for assets, in particular, 
had increased pro-cyclicality. 
Mr Kern went on to doubt whether it is possible to define the European 
economic cycle when there are 30 states in Europe, all with different economic 
models and financial systems. “What is the period of the cycle? What countries 
do you focus on? How would you link capital charges to macro factors in the 
economy? Do you look at GDP growth or asset calculation increases over time? 
We also need to take into account that we have an internal market with 50 banks 
“To avoid a new crisis we have to 
scrap Basel II and start again 
from scratch.”
Alexander Kern, Senior Research Fellow 
at the University of Cambridge
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with significant cross border exposure. Is exposure where the loan is booked 
or where the borrower is?” In addition, regulation needs to be formulaic, but 
with the discretion to alter rules as innovation arises. This means internal models 
have to be used, but these are not necessarily reliable. Mr Kern concluded by 
advocating a return to a simpler rulebook, perhaps a modified version of Basel I.
Katherine Seal, Director of the London Investment Banking Association, retorted: 
“I don’t think it would be helpful if the EU and Basel took different paths. You 
have to be careful you have the outcome you expect in all jurisdictions - two 
institutions could have the same holdings in government bonds, but they don’t 
have the same value in the markets.”
Applying regulation to liquidity and transactions
Hans Helmut Kotz, Member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
said Basel II became a scapegoat, arguing that regulation is not a science. “We 
need a complementary measure such as a leverage constraint,” said Mr Kotz. 
“The root cause of the crisis is leverage. We know to look more closely at the 
repo market and all those activities that make the system less stable.”
However, he stated that Basel II has “a fallacy of composition”. He said: “We 
produced resilient banks on a micro level, but did not take account of the macro 
dimension, which produced unintended consequences.” 
Mr Kotz said he is in favour of comprehensive regulation, where identical risks 
are treated identically. “There is no reason to treat cashflows differently whether 
“We produced resilient banks on 
a micro-level, but did not take 
account of the macro dimension, 
which produced unintended 
consequences.” 
Hans Helmut Kotz, Member of the Executive 
Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank
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on balance or off balance sheet.” There should be regulation to differentiate 
between market liquidity and funding liquidity, he said. Increasing capital, and 
having higher quality of capital is important. 
It is important to address the issue of social usefulness, he added. “I don’t like the 
idea of a Tobin Tax - I prefer an idea brought up in Germany in the last decade.” 
Namely ‘function efficiency’, whereby the financial system produces services for 
the real economy at the lowest possible level of transaction costs. “Boring banking 
is important. By reducing volatility, reducing risk, and using the current window of 
opportunity, we should be able to move to a better financial system,” Mr Kotz concluded. 
New rules must account for human behaviour
Guy Levy-Rueff, Deputy Director of Research and Policy at the Banque de France said 
human behaviour is key to cyclicality. “To combat this, we have to lean against the wind 
and this is always hard to do,” said Mr Levy Rueff. “We have done so in the past, but we 
must do so more efficiently and in a coordinated manner in the future.” 
Mr Levy-Rueff said it is therefore a priority to work on incentives, particularly 
remuneration policy, in the banking sector in addition to capital requirements. 
“People in the financial sector should not get free lunches because this is a 
recipe for inefficiency,” Mr Levy-Rueff added. 
 Basel II needs to evolve, but many parts of it are effective, he argued. While 
most people recognised that Pillar I should be tougher, Pillar II should also be 
considered an important tool. “It allows in particular to make financial innovation 
compatible with financial stability” he claimed. It should do so by distinguishing 
between, on the one hand, financial innovation accompanied by sound capital/
liquidity buffers as well as risk management improvements and, on the other hand, 
“Banks should not rely on a single risk management tool, but 
on a combination of simple and sophisticated tools as well as a 
mix between quantitative and qualitative judgement.” 
Guy Levy-Rueff, Deputy Director of Research 
and Policy at the Banque de France
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regulatory arbitrage which seek to get free lunches at the expense of sound internal 
control. “Pillar 2 is here to make sure that risk management improvement evolves 
at the same pace as products, sales and trades. Although this entails more short-
term costs, banks should accept it in order to decrease in the medium term the 
probability of dramatic losses,” he said. 
The crisis has also shown that more sophisticated quant models to assess tail risk 
are needed. At the same time, simple risk management tools as well as expert 
judgements are also useful, because when you build models you always have model 
risk. “Banks should not rely on a single risk management tool, but on a combination of 
simple and sophisticated tools as well as a mix between quantitative and qualitative 
judgement,” said Mr Levy Rueff. Academics, supervisors and banks alike need to 
work on the optimum articulation between these various risk management tools.
Mr Milne agreed with this assessment. “We need both something crude and 
complex at the same time. I am happy for banks to use complex models to satisfy 
their shareholders but we also need them to hold a certain amount of capital. We 
must keep these things separate, it would be a mistake to lump them together.” 
Panel on emerging market perspectives
Giles Merritt opened the debate by remarking that the current crisis has been a 
catalyst for people to re-examine the entire global economy. “Developing countries 
have been hit unfairly and very hard by the credit crisis, but were sheltered from 
the financial meltdown because they were not sophisticated enough to be hit.” 
He asked whether the new regulatory framework has to be tailored to non-OECD 
countries and how the G20 mechanism might achieve this.
Regulation must take developing economies into account
Cornelia Richter, Director General of the Planning and Development Department 
of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), said that 
many developing countries are not represented in the G20 and yet the social 
costs of the crisis are worst outside the G20 countries. “The World Bank estimates 
that 53m people in developing countries have been affected by this crisis and 
live in absolute poverty, of $2 or less a day,” said Ms Richter. “According to the 
World Bank, remittances will fall by 20%.  So the GTZ stresses the importance 
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of a regulatory framework but seeks to include the perspectives of developing 
countries. It is a big challenge to find the balance.” 
At the moment there is a highly differentiated supervision of Basel II in developing 
countries, Ms Richter said. Some countries did not implement Basel II because 
of the lack of capacity and market infrastructure. Capital adequacy rules should 
be carefully designed to be counter-cyclical. “A comprehensive approach is not 
just about the regulatory system, it must include access to finance in developing 
countries - this is part of the G20 agenda.”  
GTZ gives direct assistance in 30 countries, including helping to strengthen 
financial services in terms of insurance, institutional set-ups, financial 
literacy and consumer awareness and protection. Another important field 
is financial stability. 
GTZ also supports G20 countries such as China and Indonesia by helping 
supervisory institutions with risk management schemes for the banking sector 
and in Africa, there is a broad initiative to strengthen institutions.  
“The magnitude of the crisis is so big that we need to scale up the approaches 
and concepts,” said Ms Richter. “So we have joined hands with the Bill Gates 
foundation which has ambitious goals and wants to reach at least 50m people.”
Although the topic of discussion is the financial and economic crisis, it should 
be linked to other crises, including the environmental crisis. “How do we interlink 
these different international agendas?” asked Ms Richter. 
“We stress the importance of a regulatory 
framework but say you have to include 
the perspectives of developing countries. 
It is a big challenge to find the balance.” 
Cornelia Richter, Director General of the Planning and 
Development Department of the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
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Liberalisation of capital flows seen as negative
Arturo O’Connell, Member of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of 
Argentina, said a discussion of changes to Basel II should be preceded by an 
examination of what kind of banking system is desirable. “In developing countries 
it is a crucial question,” said Mr O’Connell. “We should not be shy of creating state 
institutions to fund development projects. Under Basel, you can hardly do that.”
 However, Basel II should not be blamed for the crisis since market failures existed 
in times previous to its adoption, he said. Mr O’Connell suggested one or both 
of the following policies should be adopted. That is, re-instituting a clear division 
between deposit-taking institutions and investment banks Act and changing the 
way that risk is calculated to take into account systemic risk, for instance, by 
applying network theory and that credit ratings agencies should be regulated. 
Mr O’Connell said the liberalisation of capital flows is not necessarily positive. “The 
idea that inflows of capital into emerging economies are necessary for growth is 
not true. In fact, they are negative for growth. Countries that are self-financing have 
done much better.” Countries can protect themselves from the negative effects 
of capital flows by self insurance. i.e., accumulating foreign exchange reserves 
or they can insist in reforming international facilities to assist countries in case of 
running into balance of payments problems, he said.
Currency mismatches are another major issue, Mr O’Connell argued, especially 
since many countries have a partially dollarised currency and banking system. 
“Forty percent of loans in the developing world in 2001 were denominated in 
foreign currencies,” he noted. “This may have somewhat changed, but the 
principle is still there. The problem is about the ultimate debtor, not about the 
mismatch of the financial institution making the intermediation.
“The idea that inflows of capital into 
emerging economies are necessary 
for growth is not true. In fact, they are 
negative for growth. Countries that are 
self-financing have done much better.”  
Arturo O’Connell, Member of the Board of 
Governors of the Central Bank of Argentina
Jonathan Fiechter, Deputy Director of the Monetary and Financial Systems 
Department of the International Monetary Fund, noted that there had been a 
number of crises in his working lifetime and all had been accompanied by “never 
again” conferences. He acknowledged this is inevitable, since problems tend to 
emerge from “left field”. He recommended a series of actions: 
§ As regards Basel II, a lot of emerging markets have spent time and effort on Pillar II, 
   improving supervisory capacity, and it is important that these efforts are supported.
§ A number of systemically important institutions are undercapitalised below   
 required levels and this should be remedied.  
§ Failures of insolvent banks should be permitted. “In the US and other countries,
   we have confused an orderly resolution with not allowing a bank to fail,” 
  said Mr Fiechter. “I’m not certain that any bank is too big to fail.”
§ Rules are only as good as the quality of the people who enforce them. 
  Aspects of Basel II are very complex and it is hard for anyone not in the Basel  
  community to implement them. 
§ Provisions are as important as having more and better capital.
He continued that there are benefits to simplicity. “I agree with the benefits of 
international rules, but people must be able to understand them. Basel is coming 
up with capital ratios that can be computed. It is good if reasonably smart people 
can figure out what the capital ratio of a bank is,” said Mr Fiechter.
He finally added that there should be mechanisms for the financial system to “pay 
for its own mess”. He recalled how in the US the industry paid for the S&L crisis. 
The financial system could be required to pay for rebuilding deposit insurance.
“In the US and other countries, 
we have confused an orderly 
resolution with not allowing a bank 
to fail. I’m not certain that any 
bank is too big to fail.” 
Jonathan Fiechter, Deputy Director of the 
Monetary and Financial Systems Department 
of the International Monetary Fund




It is inevitable that such a serious crisis should engender calls for radically 
revamped regulation. Indeed, since this roundtable took place, there have 
already been signs that these calls are starting to be answered – to a greater or 
lesser extent – across the world.
However, regulation is just one part of the solution; other elements are required 
too. For example, unappealing as it may sound to many, a return to the past 
is perhaps desirable. The structure of many banks three decades ago, when 
most existed as partnerships, produced a greater alignment of interests 
between customers and board members than can be found in modern banking 
today. A return to this structure is unlikely to take place via regulation, but could 
take place if customers of the major banks demanded it. This would also help 
to solve the problem of the industry having grown disproportionately large. 
Banking should serve, not control, the real economy, and structures that reflect 
this are desirable.
Equally, the solution to the problem of “toxic” derivatives is unlikely to be applied 
purely through regulation. The growth of Collateralised Debt Obligations and 
Credit Default Swaps is widely seen as negative for financial stability and 
there is currently a move to force most over-the-counter derivatives onto 
exchanges. This idea, championed by the Obama administration, is intended 
to reduce counterparty risk, but systemic risk may still remain unless the 
relevant exchanges are capitalised with, potentially, trillions of dollars. Few 
discussants believed any rational market participant would agree to take on 
such large liabilities.
Lasting reform is possible, but it requires the support of the public at 
large, not just of a handful of politicians and regulators. A new social 
cost-benefit analysis of the impact of crises would perhaps help the 
public and market participants alike to understand the necessity of 
avoiding another banking meltdown. If the pain of people at the bottom 
of the pile could be felt by all, a stronger movement for change would 
surely emerge.
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ANNEX II -  Programme 
09.30 – 10.00       Introductory remarks by 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, President of the Party of European Socialists and 
Joseph Stiglitz, Co-President of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia 
University and Nobel Prize Winner in Economics (2001)
SESSION I PROMOTING FINANCIAL STABILITY IN BASEL II
10.00 – 13.00
The healthiness of the banking and financial system remains unstable, despite 
massive liquidity injections and credit facilities by public institutions. This should 
raise questions on how to adjust Basel II agreements to prevent future systemic 
crises in the banking sector, and thus in the real economy. It is therefore crucial 
to analyse the boom-bust patterns of the Basel II agreements, the way counter-
cyclical tools have been introduced and experienced in different parts of the 
world, and how counter-cyclicality principles could be introduced into a reformed 
Basel II or Basel III. 
Moderated by Giles Merritt, Secretary General of Friends of Europe and Gillian Tett, 
Capital Markets Editor of the Financial Times
Avinash Persaud  Chairman of Intelligence Capital Limited and Chair of  
   the Warwick Commission
Stephany Griffith-Jones Head of Financial Markets of the Initiative for Policy 
   Dialogue at Columbia University
Elemér Terták  Director of the Directorate ‘Financial Institutions’ in
   the European Commission Directorate General for
   Internal Market and Services
Stefan Walter  Secretary General of the Basel Committee on Banking 
   Supervision
13.00 – 14.00       Networking lunch
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14.00 – 14.45       Introductory remarks and reporting on the first session by 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, President of the Party of European Socialists, 
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Joaquín Almunia, EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs
SESSION II DOES COUNTER-CYCLICALITY POINT TO BASEL III?
14.45 – 16.45
Financial institutions must be encouraged to clean up their balance sheets as 
a pre-requisite for rehabilitating the financial system and re-establishing stable 
growth worldwide. At the same time, financial regulators will have to build the 
necessary monetary counter-cyclical tools. In the process, the appearance of the 
same risks which caused the present financial crisis must be prevented. 
Moderated by Ernst Stetter, Secretary General of the Foundation for European 
Progressive Studies (FEPS) Giles Merritt, Secretary General of Friends of Europe
   Panel on European perspectives:
Claudio Borio        Head of Research and Policy Analysis of the Bank
   for International Settlements
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16.45                    End of roundtable
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